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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 HEADQUARTERS 1ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
 APO SF 96247

AND-C

STUDIED: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE (20 June 1966)

FROM: Commanding General
 I Field Force Vietnam
 APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
 US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
 ACTN: J343
 APO US Forces 96243

Operation Hawthorne
 Headquarters 1st Brigade
 101st Airborne Division

(12) 38p.

DEC 4 1966

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation HAWTHORNE.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 2 June thru 20 June 1966.
3. (U) Location: KONTUM Province. (18) OACSFOR
4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (C) Task Organization: (19) OT-RD-66X102

7. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation HAWTHORNE is shown below. This organization remained relatively unchanged throughout the operation, with the following exceptions: (1) 1/5 Cav and 1/6 Cav came under the operational control of the 1st Brigade on 10 and 8 June 1966 respectively and (2) AFV military and paramilitary forces were attached or under operational coordination with the 1st Brigade during various phases of the operation. The SV units are listed below in paragraph 6b.

TF 1/27

1/27 Inf
 Bn/320 Arty
 Demo Tn A 326 Engr

TF 2/502

2/502 Inf
 C 2/320 Arty
 Demo Tn A 326 Engr
 IP Tn
 PAC

2/320 Arty (-)

B 1/30 Arty

Snt Bn (-)

Sde Troops

HC (-)
 A 2/17 Cav
 A 326 Engr (-)
 LRP
 Stry Plt
 MP Plt (-)
 1/101 Lvn Soc
 20 Chon Det
 ME-1 245 Sav Ops Co
 181 MI Det
 3 RRU

FOR OT RD
 66X102

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PROJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHITE DRAGON (AOA) 1969
32-30)

b. During Operation MARIETTA, the 42nd Inf Regt (100th and 101st Airborne Divs) were in contact with the 1st Brigade through mutual coordination between the 1st Airborne, 1st Airborne, 101st Airborne Division and the 100th Airborne Division (100th). Through additional coordination the 100th Airborne Division and one of its companies were integrated into the 101st Airborne Division. These 101st units served as recovery elements, provided medical aid, provided conveyer security, protected artillery batteries and airfield operations, and screened flanks of attacking units. In addition, ten (10) Apache Patrols provided information from long range patrols conducted in the DMZ.

c. T3 2/329 Inf remained detached from the 1st Brigade and was attached to the 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) in T3 1/201 on Operation "MOUNTAIN WALK."

7. (C) Supporting Verbs:

c. 3/320 Anty: 'employee' in a direct support role.

5. B 1/30 (04200): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

c. 10th Army Division Station: "Hottel" helicopters for airmobile assaults throughout the operation. In addition, the unit flew daily resupply missions and provided "umbil" helicopter support for the operation.

d. 145th Av Co provided general support with five OH-47 helicopters.

c. 215th Am. Co provided direct support with five O-1 aircraft.

f. 5th Air Commando Squadron provided airlift support for Psy War Cps..

3. 245th Coy Gps Co provided one loudspeaker team and one leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

[illegible]

1. Sample for Command, 1947: 1947-52 missions for 36 sorties in support of the operation. These missions resulted in 22,100 (10) and 200 (1) (195).

4. 450th Medical Detachment (Ambulance): Provided continuous medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation.

5. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure F, Intelligence.

9. (U) Location: No quarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, assault search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Núi Tr, Núi Trung, Tân Tru and assist in the withdrawal of the 100th AD. 9th Regional Force outpost.

10. (U) Concept of Operations: Operation WASTHORN was conducted in two phases. See Inclosure 3, 4, and 4.3, Operations Overlays.

c. Phase I (2 June - 6 June 1966): ~~This phase~~ consisted of a three-pronged converging attack by the 1/32d Inf, the 21st Ranger Bn (ARVN) and the 412d Inf Regt (ARVN) to relieve the besieged Regional Force outpost at COU NGUONG.

MORONG.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation WHITE 11 (01: 1.01)
J3-221

Tom Merton

11. (c) Acceptance:

4. The Brimble (-) is in development from the 5700-13 area by C-130 aircraft on 24 June 1957 and about late P.M. on 3 June 1957. A total of 231 sections were utilized. On 3 June 1957, the 2/502 is developed from 5700-13 to 5700-16 by C-130 aircraft and convey.

b. Phase 1. On 3 June 1966, the 1/42 Inf Bn (ARVN) began an attack north along "I" from its base at TCU 10K10 and encountered an enemy force of an estimated 800 men. On 4 June 1966, the 1/327 Inf and 21st Ranger Bn (ARVN) conducted a limited assault on the south. This three-pronged converging attack was intended to relieve the besieged National Forces outpost at TCU 10K10. To insure the uninterrupted advance of the 1/42 Inf Bn (ARVN) after it was attacked on 4 June and to provide artillery support for the 1/327 Inf, a 105 mm mortar battery and a rifle company were lifted by helicopter ahead of the 1/42 Inf Bn (ARVN) along the ARVN Battalion's axis of advance. This force became lightly engaged on the evening of 3 and 4 June having landed just to the west of the ARVN in contact with the 1/42 Inf Bn (ARVN). On 5 June 1966, the three battalions converged on TCU 10K10 with the 1/327 Inf securing the terrain northeast of the TCU 10K10 GCR outpost and the 1/42 Inf Bn (ARVN) and 21st Ranger Battalion (ARVN) linking up and cutting the supply of the garrison. Without further incident, the TCU 10K10 garrison was withdrawn and returned mid-afternoon of 6 June 1966 to the vicinity of RVN 70 along with the 1/42 Inf Bn (ARVN) and the 21st Ranger Battalion (ARVN). The 1/327 Inf remained at TCU 10K10 and the supporting 105 mm mortar battery and the rifle company as security remained in the valley from Hilarators to the east of TCU 10K10.

c. Phase III: The evening of 3 June 1966, the 1/227 Inf made night contact with the enemy. In early afternoon of 7 June 1966 the artillery battery and 40mm mortar rifle company were heavily attacked with mortar fire, machine gun, and sniper fire and 40mm mortar. The Night Squad until 0400 hours when the 1st Recon withdrew on a flight in consultation. On 7 June 1966, the 1/227 Inf received a call in the early afternoon for enemy resistance. At this time, the 2/127 Inf was alerted as 1 1/2 B Co. moved and immediately deployed in an amphibious assault to envelop the enemy's northern flank. From 8 through 10 June 1966, movement of the 1st Recon with the enemy shifted continuously as the 1/227 Inf and 2/127 Inf sought to isolate the 1st Recon from entrenched positions in the dense barbed wire. The rifle company released from the 1/227 Inf at 0700 and was inserted into the main effort to seal off enemy escape routes. The 1/5 Coy was also able to establish in the Commanding General's 1st Brigade on 12 June 1966 and together with one B Co. company took up positions along the northwest road which appeared to be the enemy's most likely communication route. The 1/42 Inf Co + 1/127 Inf Co were available to the 24th Tactical Zone Commander and helicopter along the northern edge of the zone to complete the encirclement of the enemy force. At 0800 on 11 June 1966, one volunteer provisional rifle company, 40mm mortar, and 40mm mortar from the 1st Recon moved at 0800 hours were helicopter into the area to join the fight. Pressure was brought to bear on the enemy on all sides. As the day, intent on location of the enemy force became clear, a decision was made to request a B-52 strike on the final enemy. The strike was requested for 0600 hours 12 June 1966 to provide time to execute friendly casualties and re-plant front line positions behind the three

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUNG HOI (NVA/JGV J3-32) 22 July 1966

kilometer safety line. An attempt to establish a 10 kilometer support plan was developed to keep the enemy engaged from 11 through 13 June 1966. The 1st Infantry Brigade was redeployed on 13 June to a position west of the 10 km line to block possible enemy infiltration. The 1st Infantry Brigade, 400 SS were deployed into the center of the 10 km line, covering about one square kilometer. Between 0600 and 0747 hours 13 June 1966, the B-52 strike was launched precisely on target. Following the strike, enemy contact was established and the 1/227 Inf, 2/502 Inf, 1/5 Cav, 1/227 Inf (A Det) and 31st elements immediately exploited the objective area by helicopter and on land movement. Thirty minutes following the B-52 strike, one rifle company from 1/502 Inf was helilifted into the B-52 target area. Large numbers of VC PWs, weapons and equipment were found in the area. The 2/502 Inf lost and captured 15 dead VC personnel. On 15 June elements of the 2/502 Inf and 1/5 Cav engaged VC force north of the B-52 strike and the enemy broke contact following tactical air strikes. In the final phase of the operation, the 1/5 Cav assaulted the valley northwest of the strike area and swept southeast to pick up enemy stragglers. On 17 June 1966, the 1/227 Inf made an all sweep around the south of the HUNG HOI with expectations of capturing an enemy hospital. Further operations produced any sizeable contact.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division succeeded in its mission to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong forces in the DAK TO, TAN CHU and TAN HUNG HOI area.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during Operation HUNG HOI.

(1) Personnel losses:

479	VC KIA (DC)
506	VC KIA (DVC)
52	VC KIA (DC)
209	VC KIA (DVC)
10	VC KIA (DVC)
22	VC
0	VC

(2) Weapons Captured:

WEAPON	QUANTITY	REMARKS
M-79	1	US
M-72	1	US
Mausch "90" Rifle	2	German
Luger, 9mm, Pistol	1	German
S&W Carbine	19	Chicom
AK-47	51	Chicom
Flare Pistol	1	Chicom
RPG-2 Rocket Launcher	13	Chicom
12.7mm Barrels & Sight	2	Chicom
RPG W/C	3	Chicom
7.62mm TCMARIN Pistol	1	Russian
Rifle	11	Unknown

Total 112

(3) Ammunition:

WEAPON	QUANTITY
12.7mm	3,000 rds
82mm Mortar	35 rds
75mm	3 rds

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORN (35: 11W 34-1)

4011	100 lbs
4012	75 lbs
4013	10,000 lbs

(4) Signal Equipment:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Genie Wrt.	300 ft
Field Phone (Chico)	2

(5) Explosives:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
100 - 1/2 lb block	190
Chico Mines (Chico)	2
Land Mines	1
Hand Grenades	102

(6) Clothing:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Grenades	45
Shirts	25
Shoes	10 pr

(7) Food:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Food	22 tons

(8) Medical Supplies:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Medical Kit (Chico)	5
Band-aids, drugs, pills, surgical equipment	Numerous

(9) Miscellaneous:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Load Bearing Equipment	57
Shovel	23
Entrenching Tool	23
Bicycle	13

(10) Corps Destroyed:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
20151340	Company to Battalion
20156371	Company
20159419	Company
20160377	Battalion
20163345	Battalion

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HOCV J3-32)

(11) All Positions Destroyed: 0.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 1, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 5, Logistics.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. M-79 cannon rounds: The conventional high explosive M-79 round was found to have limited value in the thick bamboo jungles, since the round could not penetrate the undergrowth. The XM564P cannon round for the M-79 Grenade Launcher, however, proved to be highly effective in penetrating the bamboo. The shot pattern at 100 yards provides an extremely high number of first-round hits. The use of this round together with the 60mm mortar was effective in discouraging "hugging" tactics of the enemy in dense jungle.

b. D-52 target indication: Successful exploitation of the D-52 target with airborne assaults following a strike proved advantageous. It enabled the assaulting unit to capture the surviving stunned enemy before they had a chance to evacuate the area. The search of the target area must be systematic. Accurate search time must be allocated to permit uncovering the maximum number of enemy weapons and equipment. Digging may be required since the enemy may have hastily attempted to hide equipment.

c. Bombletitions: Cratering charges are more effective than TAT or C-4 for the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and caches. Although cratering charges are ordered and not easily transportable by foot mobile elements, the charge is very stable and can easily be delivered to an area by employing free-fall techniques from a hovering helicopter.

d. CH-47 "piggy-back" hoist: Lifting of artillery units by CH-47 helicopters can be accomplished through the use of "piggy-back" sling loads. This technique reduces the time and number of sorties required.

15. (C) Surveillance Analysis:

a. Report Journal:

(1) Polaroid camera: The addition of a Polaroid camera to the RPT at brigade level would assist in gathering and dissemination timely information. They would be useful in obtaining accurate reports, intelligence and historical information. Polaroid camera could also be effectively used in Psychological Warfare operations to take Land Line pictures of soldiers to be used on specialized leaflets.

(2) Supply of stretched CORD units: Most CORD personnel are armed with either the caliber .45 M&M S&B or Caliber .38 Carbine and provisions must be made for having such ammunition immediately available for resupply. CORD personnel prefer to be given fish and rice (their normal diet) rather than C-rations. These two rapidly rotting should be handled through Special Forces advisers and not by direct resupply by the Daikido S-4.

(3) Helicopter winch systems: Many missions require the use of helicopters with a winch capability. The hoist on the UH-1B med-evac needs to be modified to increase its reliability. The hoist of the CH-47 is adequate but is too slow for personnel evacuation. The hoist of the Marine Corps CH-46

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HCV J3-32)

In addition, however, we believe the AH-1H is also at home in the
Air Force and Marine helicopters are to be used only on a mission
basis. Consideration should be given to providing the Brigade two HH-43 heli-
copters until the AH-1H is available to provide for reliable extraction.

(4) Assignment of utility aircraft to the Infantry Battalion: It
has been found useful to attach two UH-1H helicopters, when availability permits,
to each of the Infantry Battalions for use under the direct control of the bat-
talion commander. The assignment of these utility helicopters can provide the
commander with flexibility for resupply, liaison, medical evacuation and small unit
troop movements.

(5) Construction and improvement of landing zones: The absence of
natural landing zones is a serious problem in dense terrain. A more systematic
and faster method of clearing and expanding landing zones must be established.
The attachment of engineer LZ clearing squads to each assault battalion has
proved effective.

(6) Tactical air and artillery support: Continuous and simultaneous
artillery and tactical air support of the same target area continues to be a
problem. A possible solution would be to have one UH-1H (AH/AC-24) radio in the
artillery FDC and to have an artillery PG accompany the FDC. The PG would be
equipped with an AH/AC-25 radio. This would provide continuous communications
between the artillery FDC, PG, FDC's and fighter pilots and thus permit direct
coordination.

(7) Flame throwers: Flame throwers have been found to be too
cumbersome to be carried by elements maneuvering in front in dense jungle terrain.
Flame throwers should be thrown into the objective area as required. Support Bat-
talion with the assistance of the 20th Chemical Detachment has been given the
responsibility for maintaining three portable flame throwers in a ready, charged
state to be issued to the using unit on short notice.

(8) POW's: In Operation MANTICORE, prisoners were not captured
until late in the operation. Individual soldiers must be impressed with the
importance of capturing prisoners. They are inclined to be too quick on the
trigger.

(9) Psychological Warfare:

(a) One school trained Psychological Warfare officer should
be assigned to the Brigade. Additionally, a small Psy Ops detachment with the
capability of printing, producing and delivering leaflets should be attached to
the Brigade. This would increase the efficiency of Psy Ops in the Brigade and
would reduce the time required to accomplish a mission.

(b) The split responsibility between the Army and the Air
Force at Brigade level creates a problem. The ground tactical commander should
have command of all Psy War activities in order that they be immediately res-
ponsive to the changing situation.

(c) Consideration should be given to establishing a US or
FBI POW Command which would insure treatment of prisoners in accordance with
the Geneva Convention. Such an effort should be publicized and extensively to
include all news media, leaflets and broadcasts.

b. Highlights of Operation:

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22 July 1966
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation "HUMPHREY" (US: MACV J3-32)

(1) Maintenance of contact with enemy: Continuous contact was maintained with the enemy from 0400 hours of 3 June until the screening forces broke contact on 17 June. Following the break, contact was reestablished while maintaining indirect fire for several days thereafter.

(2) Fire power: The Brigade employed the equivalent of 1.6 BT of air and artillery ordnance (27,000 pounds of artillery). Of the 499 air sorties, 150 were "close spot". It is believed that the ARVN was dealt a psychological blow to its unseasoned offensive by employing close air support around the clock. The ARVN night attack is considered to have been an outstanding example of the use of the B-52 in a close support role.

(3) Maneuver: The double envelopment, with major forces attacking the enemy from the south and north, together with massive use of fire power, is the most successful tactic we have employed. This was the same tactic employed so successfully in the past at BINH GIANG in Operation "HUMPHREY". Rapid exploitation of B-52 strikes by an airmobile operation in the center of the target area was effective.

(4) Operation with ARVN Forces: In addition to Major ARVN forces, the Brigade was assisted by nine CPT companies, one Regional Forces company, and one ARVN scout company. Ten Special Forces were also employed. The Special Forces A and B Teams in Kontum Province are considered to be the most effective, responsive, and productive encountered in operations in eight provinces during the past six months. The A Team leaders are an outstanding group.

(5) Enemy: The enemy proved to be disciplined, well-trained, tenacious fighters. Excellent camouflage, field fortifications, and battlefield police were demonstrated. One weakness noticed was a lack of flexibility. The attempted ambush of the ARVN battalion on 3 June was practically a repeat of the operation last year.

(6) Psychological Operations: The initial support was weak but gradually improved. A total of six million leaflets were dropped and 24 hours of loudspeaker time was utilized. Four CPTUS MOI soldiers were directly credited to the broadcasts.

(7) Mobility: During the operation nearly 15,000 passengers were moved and 33 airmobile assaults were made; eight of the assaults were of battalion size. In addition, seven artillery batteries were moved into firing position to support the operation.

16. (C) Recommendations:

- a. That consideration be given to establishing and publicizing a US or ARVN Prisoner of War Command.
- b. That the manufacture and issue of the M57GP round for the M-79 and the one-shot flame thrower be expedited.
- c. That the hoists on the UH-1D and OH-47 helicopters be modified to increase reliability and speed of operation.
- d. That Polaroid cameras be included in the TOC at Brigade level for use in psychological operations and investigations.
- e. That the Brigade be provided with one school trained Psychological

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations in the Delta Area, Operation HATHOR (SS: 100-10-1)

Warfare Officer's Office - 1 Point - supplies - table of printing, packaging
and distribution.

Jeffrey Dawson

Director General,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Wash.
D.C.

מחיר: 100 ₪

- 1 - Parsons
- 2 - Hollingsworth
- 3 - Hollingsworth, Scientific Thesis I
- 4 - Hollingsworth, Scientific Thesis II
- 5 - Hollingsworth
- 6 - Hollingsworth
- 7 - Hollingsworth
- 8 - Hollingsworth, Scientific Thesis I
- 9 - Hollingsworth

[illegible]

- 3 - Chief of Staff for Moral Development, Dept of the Army
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Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to After Action Reports, Operation HAWTHORNE.

1. (C) Unit Strengths:

a. Beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5940
Joined not Assigned	116
Present for Duty	5252
Not Present for Duty	472
Air Head Strength	2308
Base Camp	1493
Tuy Hoa	1601

(2) The assigned strength was 130% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 119% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 339 were hospitalized personnel.

b. Conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

Authorized	4490
Assigned	5549
Joined not assigned	115
Present for Duty	4703
Not Present for Duty	931
Air Head Strength	2431
Base Camp	1527
Tuy Hoa	755

(2) The assigned was 129% of the authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 105% of the authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength, 421 were hospitalized personnel.

c. The "assigned" strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the "not present for duty" because:

(1) A large number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to off-shore hospitals, CCNUS, and/or even discharged from the US Army without notification to the losing unit.

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Inclosure 1 (contd)

(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (ALCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively coming on when in the "pipeline".

(3) ALCSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the receiving units.

2. (C) Casualties:

a. Casualties for Operation HAWTHORNE were as follows:

UNIT	DEAD	MIA
1/327	0	135
2/327	1	71
2/328	4	24
2/326	1	6
2/327	0	2
2/329	7	1
TOTAL	13	239

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

KIA	222
MIA	1207
POW	2

3. (C) Personnel Requirements:

a. A total of 201 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakdown of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows:

1/327	100
2/327	118
2/329	21

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical LOS were assigned as follows:

Plat Ldrs	11
Plat Sgts	10
Doctors	2
Med Tech Assts	2
Medics	5

c. Emergency requisitions for continuing critical LOS shortages were submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, clerks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.

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Inclosures 1 (contd)

4. (U) Personnel Services, AF, Finance, SJA, and American Red Cross representatives visited the forward area and provided assistance. The Brigade has received an additional and field representative which will provide extended AMC service.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUNTHORSE

1. (C) Terrain: The terrain of operations consisted of mountainous terrain rising to heights of 2900 meters. The vegetation, varying between open forest with heavy undergrowth and rain forest with a dense jungle canopy, limited observation and fields of fire, while providing excellent cover and concealment. Highway 14 was the principal north-south avenue of approach, while well defined trails (XB 806670 to XB 106650, YB 696620 to ZB 106650, YB 810150 to AS 830160) provided the principal east-west avenues. The terrain favored enemy infiltration operations by providing concealment from aerial observation and restricted our operations with a lack of landing zones.

2. (U) Weather: The southwest monsoon dominated the weather, although there was less rain and cloudiness than expected. High winds occurred infrequently, but low cloud conditions and rain began late each afternoon and lasted until early the following morning. The weather limited aerial activity and restricted visibility during early morning hours when ground fog was prevalent. These weather conditions generally favored the enemy by concealing his activity and movement from aerial observation.

3. (C) At the beginning of Operation HUNTHORSE, the following information was available regarding enemy activity:

a. Major VC infiltration routes crossed the Cambodian and Laotian borders in this area.

b. Three NVA ralliers at DAK TO, who said they were platoon leaders in the 88th NVA Regiment, reported their unit to be at XB 7845 with a reconnaissance element at TAM CHAI (18 May 1966) preparing for an attack on that village.

c. A rallier from the 4th Bn 24th NVA Regiment reported his battalion at ZB 612332.

d. A captured diary disclosed VC plans of another BATTAL BATTAL somewhere in the highlands, with the main axis in KONTUM Province.

e. Other information led to the belief that one battalion of the 24th NVA Regiment was north of TOU MORONG (ZB 135354) and two battalions were southwest of TOU MORONG (ZB 1225).

f. TOU MORONG had received sporadic small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar harassing attacks from the north from 22 May to 28 May 1966.

4. (C) During the operation, the intelligence situation was developed through front line contact.

a. Enemy prisoners and documents gave the identification of engaged units as the 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of the 24th NVA Regiment.

b. The enemy was located by moving units into the TOU MORONG area after an artillery outpost had been attacked on the morning of 7 June 1966. This front line contact was the principal source of information about the enemy's location from 7 June until the end of the operation.

5. (C) Results:

a. Initial Order of Battle:

(1) Prior to the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne division in the DAK TO area, it was believed that two NVA Regiments were preparing for an attack on the TOU MORONG outpost.

(2) Ralliers and prisoners indicated that these units were the 24th and 88th NVA Regiments. Ralliers indicated that the 24th was located in the immediate TOU MORONG area and the 88th was located in Laos.

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Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation RANTHOMRE

(3) Total enemy strength in the area of interest was estimated to be 4000 NVA personnel and 2400 Viet Cong local force and guerrilla personnel.

(4) Initial enemy dispositions:

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH	DATE	EVALUATION
24th NVA Regt	Vic TON MORONG	2000	-	Uncnf Prob
U/I Bn 24th Regt	ZS 1237	400	26 May	Uncnf Prob
2 U/I Bns				
24th Regt	ZS 1225	800	26 May	Uncnf Prob
88th NVA Regt	YS 9545	1800	28 May	Uncnf Poss
200 NW Bn (NW)	YS 9363	200	29 May	Confirmed
304 Bn (NW)	ZS 2326	210	29 May	Confirmed
8-10 LP Cos	Scattered	500	-	-
Guerrillas	Scattered	2100	-	-

b. OB Summary and Findings:

(1) Units identified by POW's:

(a) 24th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div

4th Bn Cos 1, 2, 3
5th Bn, Cos 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
6th Bn, Cos 11, 12, 13
17th Combat Support Co
19th Eng Co
20th Med Evac Co
21st AS Co
22d Trans Co

(2) Units identified by documents:

K5 - 5th Bn 24th NVA Regt
Camp Traung 24 - Worksite 24 - 24th NVA Regt
Camp Traung 6 - Agricultural Site 6
K-1
T-28
K3-1
K2-5
L-A
TV - Unl coded PT Compound

(3) POW's stated that a major base complex and the 304th Div Hq was located in Tarent, Laos where the regiment stayed for approximately one month before entering South Vietnam.

(4) The mission of the 24th Regt was to attack DAN TO and TON MORONG and ambush ARVN relief forces. Reports from the 24th and 88th Regts stated that the 88th was to coordinate with the 24th Regt in these attacks.

(5) In engagements with the 24th NVA Regt in the TON MORONG vicinity between 9 and 13 June 1966, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division rendered this NVA Unit ineffective as a combat force. Casualties to the 24th Regt were 1231 killed by body count and estimate. It is probable that it will be several months before the unit can obtain replacements and again become effective as a combat unit.

(6) Morale of the NVA troops is reported to be low as a result of the extreme difficulties encountered during infiltration, lack of medical supplies, lack of food, high malaria rate, and fear of friendly air attacks and artillery fire.

(7) Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 2 lists the final order of battle of enemy forces in KONTUM Province.

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Incl. sure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HAWTHORNE

(8) Incl. sure 2 to Incl. sure 2 gives the composition, disposition and strength of the 24th AVN Regt.

c. VC personnel and equipment losses are shown in paragraph 12b to the basic After Action Report.

6. Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:

a. Analysis:

(1) The DAN VC, TCU MORONG, DAN SUT area is a major VC base area as indicated by the degree of resistance and nature of defenses found.

(2) The VC planned a major offensive in the DAN VC, TCU MORONG, DAN SUT area as indicated by their abortive attack of 7 June 1966 as well as the aggressive action of their units on 9, 10 and 11 June.

(3) The VC plan in the DAN VC, TCU MORONG, DAN SUT area has been set back as indicated by the fifty percent or more casualties taken by the 24th AVN Regt.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Immediate deployment of IPW teams to points of VC capture, enhances the timeliness of information gained and negates the possibility of false or misleading information gained by untrained interrogators.

(2) Enemy forces in the area are better supplied and bolder than those encountered in other parts of the II Corps area. They are more prone to stand and fight and will readily reinforce and engage unit. This was displayed when C 2/502 encountered a reinforced VC platoon which was subsequently supported by a battalion size force.

(3) North Vietnamese map coverage of the operational area should be provided to IPW teams and front line battalions. Frequently captives can read their own maps when they cannot read ours.

(4) Trail studies verified by ground reports should be developed for the Brigade's own use and other US, ARVN and FMFP units.

(5) Aggressive visual reconnaissance flown by the 219th Avn Co provided information on enemy activity throughout the TAO. In 145 hours of visual reconnaissance flown, 240 significant sightings were reported to the S-2. This has proved to be an excellent method of gathering intelligence information while units are in major conflict.

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Inclosure 1 (Pl. 1a) Title of Army Forces in Kanton Province)
to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Current Operations with Action Report,
Operation HAWTHORNE

UNIT	LOCATION	STA. NO.	DATE	EVALUATION
24th NVA Regt	Unlocated	333	-- --	Confirmed
U/I Bn 24th	ZB 1752	(200)	16 Jun	"
U/I Bn 24th	ZB 1455	(200)	16 Jun	"
U/I Bn 24th	ZB 1924	(200)	22 Jun	"
88th NVA Regt	YB 8535	1200	16 Jun	Unconf Prob
VMC Co	YB 9313	100	24 May	Unconfirmed
303E NVA Infil Grp	ZB 2210	200	15 Jun	"
303E NVA Infil Grp	AS 8305	180	15 Jun	"
2 VMC Cos	ZB 1312	160	10 Jun	"
U/I Bn	ZB 1409	200	14 Jun	"

2-1-1


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Inclosure 2 (Composition, Disposition, and Strength of the 24th NVA Regt)
to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HASTINGS

1. (C) Composition:



304 Div - Code name - CONG THUONG 6

24th Regt - Code name - CONG THUONG SA BINH

1st Bn - K-4

2nd Bn - K-5

3rd Bn - K-6

Prior to infiltration 24th Regt, designated 42, infiltrated as 6th Regiment, and now established as 24th NVA Regiment, 304th Division

2. (C) Disposition: 24th Regt, located in Kentun Province, with one battalion north of Tou Merong and two battalions southwest of Tou Merong vic ZB 1225.

3. (C) Strength: The 24th Regt, 304th NVA Div (NVA) has an actual TO&E strength of about 2000 personnel. It is estimated to be approximately 50% strength at present time. Total NVA losses as a result of Operation HASTINGS were approximately 1000.

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4. (C) Tactics: The RVN plan to attack Dak To was a three phase plan to begin during monsoon season.

Phase I. To penetrate the Hanoi area, village and strategic hub, to cut communications along Hwy #14, and to prepare ambushes along Hwy #14 (Dak To - Tan Hoa).

Phase II. To neutralize enemy forces by coordinating with friendly units of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (?) in order to encircle Dak To (Applying the tactics used in the Duc Co plan); to tire the Defenders by keeping constant pressure on them, forcing a withdrawal, and thus preparing an attack on the reinforcing column.

Phase III. When the monsoon rains become too heavy for the Air Force to resupply the Defenders, the VC will close in and capture Dak To.

5. (C) Training:

a. VC training area located: YA 962816.

b. Training of the North Vietnamese soldier:

(1) Infantry training: The basis of all instruction for the NVA soldier is Infantry. Personnel of all arms receive infantry training, including guerrilla and infiltration tactics. Emphasis is placed upon natural and artificial obstacles, and effective individual marksmanship. Experimentation is encouraged for solving tactical problems.

(2) Artillery training: Both tactical and technical training is covered. Mortars are considered artillery. Due to low literacy technical training is limited.

(3) Technical services training generally is performed "OJT".

6. (C) Logistics:

a. Installations:

YA 629827	Poss commo/liason and supply point
YD 659400	Prob storage and rice area
YA 637754	Poss supply storage and VC rest area
YD 930160	Susp VC base area
YB 909372	Poss supply point
AS 796255	Poss rice and primary storage
AS 830255	Poss way station
AS 815333	Poss supply point
AS 979439	Camp
YA 962816	Training area
ZB 138500	PW camp
YA 729853	Hospital
YA 667485	Company sized rest area
YE 8844	Rice storage

Across Cambodian Border:

YA 565676	Ordnance
YA 578596	Ordnance
YA 729853	Hospital
YA 600811	Border crossing point
YA 660670	Commo/liason station
YA 531635	Poss border crossing point
YD 669503	Dillings and storage

b. Poor transportation and lack of resources constitutes a slow system of resupply and consequently the troops receive a minimal amount of food and clothing. Ammunition makes the heaviest demands upon the supply services.

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9. NVA unit structure is as follows:

- 2 scout platoons (Binh)
- 1 platoon of nylon for a unit (over 2 meters)
- 1 medical
- 1 air signals
- 1 hat
- 1 canteen
- 1 belt
- 1 bowl, 1 spoon

7. (C) Combat Efficiency: Morale is low due to personnel losses, lack of food and medicines, and fear of combat. Combat effectiveness: 24th NVA Regt can be considered ineffective until replacements or reinforcements can be attained.

8. (C) Miscellaneous:

a. Infiltration: 24th Regiment code name SONG CAU Group. This infiltration group was divided into numerous small segments. The time lag between each element was two days march. 30 November 1965 a departure ceremony was held and the first element departed, and arrived in Kenton Province 23 June 1966. Recon platoon went ahead to locate Regimental position.

1st Element: 4th Bn, medical company, 19th Transportation Company and Recon Platoon.

2nd Element: 5th Bn, numerous subordinate units and Regimental Headquarters element.

3rd Element: 6th Bn, remaining subordinate units and Regimental HQs.

b. Personalities:


Regt CO	Maj THONG
Regt XO	Maj HANG
4th Bn CO	Sr Capt THONG
XO	Capt VAY
PO	Sr Capt CUONG
1st Co CO	Lt NHIEP
XO	Lt DAI
PO	Lt MAN
LPO	Lt DAO
2nd Co CO	BUI VAN PHON
4th Co PO	Lt Y
5th Bn CO	Capt TRUNG
XO	Capt MINH
PO	Capt AN
LPO	TRUNG
6th Co CO	Lt DUC
7th Co CO	Lt HA
8th Co CO	Lt LACH
10th Co CO	Lt NOI
6th Bn CO	CHU BAN TAN
XO	MINH
PO	HO LANG

c. Weapons in an NVA Battalion:


TYPE	NUMBER
75mm DKZ	4
82mm DKP	4
12.7 MG	9
7.62 MG	4
AK-47	For Infantry
SKS	
RPG-2 RL	1 per squad
Grenades	2 per individual

The above is an estimate of weapons type and number throughout the 4th, 5th and 6th Battalions, 24th NVA Regt, 304th Div.


INCLOSURE 3 (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE 1, 2-6 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.



INCLOSURE 4 A (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 7-10 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.



ENCLOSURE 4 B (OPERATIONS SCHEMATIC, PHASE II, 10-15 JUNE 1966)
TO COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT,
OPERATION HAWTHORNE.



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Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HA-FINCHER

1. (C) General Logistics Support:

a. Support Battalions:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control of Support Battalion (Forward). It was organized into command, operations, communications, and movement control sections.

(2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for the receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigging section and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, and a recovery and contact team.

(4) Medical Company (-): A clearing station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Forward Support Detachment (T F DONNELLY) Nha Trang Support Command accompanied the Brigade from C-80 NEO to DAN TO. It was replaced by Forward Support Detachment (T F STINSON) QUI NHON Support Command. This Forward Support Detachment (FSD) was collocated with Supply Company, Support Battalion, and was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units. The FSD was extremely cooperative and responsive throughout the operation even though the consumption rates and usage factors, particularly in Class III and V, were far above average on several occasions. When aerial resupply proved inadequate to meet all requirements, overland resupply was effected promptly and efficiently. The Deputy Commander, QUI NHON Support Command, visited the Support Battalion (Fwd) almost daily, and was instrumental in providing the excellent support received.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two airmobile companies and CV-2 aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations. The CV-2 aircraft were used to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and from the forward area. Aircraft sorties allocated were not sufficient to support the logistics plan on all occasions due primarily to large numbers of replacements and returnees transported to and from the forward area.

(3) CH-47 helicopter support was provided by 1st Aviation Company (Airmobile Medium) and 1st Cav Div (Airmobile).

(4) 498th Aviation Company: Provided medical aeroevacuation throughout the operation.

2. MATERIEL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: A total of 107 short tons of B rations and 70 tons of Meals Combat Individual Type C were issued during the operation. An adequate supply of "B" rations were received and "A" ration meats were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement every meal of B rations. However, fresh vegetables were not supplied and fresh fruit and bread were extremely limited.

(2) Class II & IV: Class II & IV supplies were shipped from Brigade Support Battalion in PHAN RANG and QUI NHON area Support Command. The following items were requested in greater quantities than

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normal: Batteries (BA 386, BA 30), concertina wire, sand bags, poncho liners, and insect repellent.

(3) Class III: 165 tons of Class III and IIIA were issued during the operation (excluding JP-4), to include 36,100 gallons of LOGIS, 9,750 gallons of DILSOL, and 7,150 gallons of ANSAB (115/145). Supporting aviation units used 325,800 gallons of JP-4 (955 tons).

(4) Class V: 819.5 short tons of Class V were issued during this operation of which 63 short tons were issued to elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile). The following items were in short supply during the operation:

- (a) Hand-held Flares
- (b) White Star Clusters
- (c) Green Star Clusters
- (d) White Star Parachute Flares

Tactical emergency resupply was used during the heaviest fighting to maintain the brigade basic load of 105mm howitzer and 155mm howitzer ammunition. The brigade requested and received an increase in the Available Supply Rate from 20 rounds to 40 rounds for 105mm howitzer ammunition during the period 8 - 12 June 1966. Two lots of 105mm howitzer ammunition were suspended. The Brigade and Forward Support Detachment, QMI MNON Area Support Command had a total of 4100 rounds of ammunition on hand that were suspended.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at Tan CANH using one 600 GPM Erdalator initially, replacing it with a 1500 GPM Erdalator airlifted from PHAN RANG.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 56 automotive, 117 signal, 94 armament, 15 instrument, 2 quartermaster and 21 engineer job orders. All but 3 signal, 1 engineer and 2 quartermaster jobs were completed. The shortage of spare parts for generators noted in previous reports still exists.

c. Ground Transportation: A total of one hundred and seventy 2 1/2 ton truck requirements were filled during the operation.

d. Air Transportation:

(1) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flew 73 sorties for a total of 1,215 passengers and 106.6 short tons of cargo.

(2) Rotary Wing: Throughout the operation both UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters proved invaluable in aerial resupply operations of committed forces. Two UH-1D were placed in direct support of the Infantry Battalions and proved to be an extremely efficient method of providing tactical and administrative support to the units. The use of the CH-47 reduced the time required for resupply from that required by the UH-1D and released the UH-1D's for support of tactical operations.

(3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 392.18 short tons of supplies in the forward area. Attached at Inclosure I is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation HAVTHORNE.

e. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by 118th Quartermaster Company, an element of the QMI MNON Area Support Command.

(2) The 349th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit in the DMK TO area.

(3) Laundry: An inservice laundry unit was initially deployed to the area of operation. Upon receipt of necessary repair

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parts, the unit was repaired and the Brigade received excellent service for the remainder of the operation.

3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The sanitation of mess halls, latrines and units areas required command emphasis to achieve minimum acceptable standards, however, health and hygiene remained excellent considering the operational environment. Two Medical Evacuation Helicopters, not equipped with winch, were made available to the Brigade. These proved unsatisfactory for extraction of seriously wounded personnel from mountainous or heavily forested terrain. Therefore, a request was made, and honored, for two Air Force CH-43 (Huskies) and two Marine CH-46 helicopters for this purpose.

b. Patients Treated:

(1) WIA	212
(2) Non-Battle Injury	172
(3) Disease	331 (7 Malaria)

Total Treated 715

c. Returned to duty 420

d. Evacuated to hospital 282

e. Remain in holding 13

f. Hospitalized personnel (battle injuries) categorized by wounds are as follows:

(1) Head	30
(2) Chest	10
(3) Upper extremities	68
(4) Lower extremities	81
(5) Abdomen	6
(6) Back	17

TOTAL 212

4. SUMMARY:

a. Supply operations were simplified by collocating the Forward Support Detachment, QUI NICH Support Command and Brigade Support Battalion. Common supply points were used for Class I, III, and V. Support Battalion, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division provided Class II and IV supply.

b. The Brigade made extensive use of the CH-47 helicopter for resupply. It proved a substantial increase in carrying capacity over that of UH-1D and therefore reduced time required for aerial resupply.

c. Water supply in the DAK TO area was a problem initially because the 600 GPH Erdalator did not function properly. A truck mounted 1500 GPH Erdalator was dismantled, brought forward from PHAN RANG and reassembled. This equipment proved a trouble free, completely adequate supply of water.

d. Hoist helicopters: Operations in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain has placed increased reliance upon medical evacuation aircraft with a hoist capability.

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5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Duplication of effort reduced by collocating the Area Forward Support Detachment with the organic Forward Support Element.
- b. Plans for provision of MEDEVAC helicopters with a hoist capability must be made prior to an operation.
- c. CH-47 Helicopters are invaluable in aerial resupply operations.

6. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Organic and Supporting logistical agencies continue to collocate in future operations.
- b. Provisions be made for MEDEVAC Helicopters with a hoist capability to support the Brigade during future operations.
- c. CH-47 Helicopters be made available for resupply missions during future operations.

1 Incl
Air Resupply Data - Operation HAWTHORNE

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Inclosure 1 (Air Resupply Data - Operation HARP CONE) to Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report Operation HARP CONE

	CLASS I		CLASS V		MISC & WATER	
	POUNDS	S-TONS	POUNDS	S-TONS	POUNDS	S-TONS
2 Jun	1,000	.50	10,000	5.00	2,500	1.25
3 Jun	1,500	.75	10,000	5.00	2,000	2.00
4 Jun	--	--	59,000	29.50	--	--
5 Jun	700	.35	30,000	15.00	350	.18
6 Jun	2,900	1.45	1,250	.62	4,250	2.12
7 Jun	1,200	.60	72,700	36.35	300	.15
8 Jun	900	.45	30,600	15.30	--	--
9 Jun	1,500	.75	27,000	13.50	4,300	2.15
10 Jun	6,000	3.00	6,400	3.20	150	.08
11 Jun	9,550	4.77	10,730	5.11	6,580	3.29
12 Jun	10,975	5.49	46,490	23.24	7,050	3.52
13 Jun	10,950	5.47	49,020	24.51	8,330	4.16
14 Jun	8,850	4.42	39,190	18.55	8,950	4.47
15 Jun	12,950	6.47	64,940	32.47	6,860	3.43
16 Jun	8,150	4.07	69,090	34.54	7,310	3.65
17 Jun	6,850	3.47	49,930	21.96	8,680	4.34
18 Jun	5,850	2.92	33,750	16.87	8,000	4.00
19 Jun	5,050	2.52	4,250	2.12	5,630	2.81
20 Jun	500	.25	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	95,375	47.70	607,850	302.84	81,240	41.60

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Inlosure 6 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action, Operation HAMTHORNT

1. (C) Background:

Operation HAMTHORNT was conducted in the area north of BAK TO, to disrupt and destroy RVN elements believed to be in the area. The Brigade signal elements provided the command communications for the Brigade and terminated the systems provided by the Corps signal units.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - The Brigade VHF was not committed until 12 June, when one system was installed to the Artillery Forward FDC. This system provided telephone communications to the forward artillery elements and also to adjacent infantry units.

b. Communications Center Section - A secure teletype circuit was operated between the Brigade and I FORCE V. This was supplemented by secure radio teletype circuits to PHU THUNG, TUY HOA, PHAM BANG; and during the initial phases of the operation, CHAO KHO and PLEIKU.

c. Switchboard and Wire Sections - The wire section laid a total of 56 miles of wire, 12 miles in the Brigade Command Post complex and 44 miles in long lines. All Command Post lines were undergrounded and all long lines overheaded. The switchboard terminated 62 common user circuits and an additional 12 solo user circuits were installed. This system provided telephone service to all units and facilities in the area and long distance trunks in the Corps area system.

d. FM Radio Section - Operated two FM Nets to reduce the traffic on the Operation Intelligence Net. Used automatic retransmission FM relay station at TOU MOUONG (Security coordinates ZB 138357).

e. Maintenance Section - The number of TT-4 teletypewriters in support maintenance has become critical.

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Shortage of replacement personnel in the Wire, Switchboard, and Communication Center Sections is a serious problem. Communication Center personnel are especially critical because of the security clearance requirements.

b. Power surges on VHF equipment burned out components of two AN/TCO-3 Telephone Carrier Terminals and burned out several complete sets of fuses in the AN/MRC-68 Terminals. The unreliability of the PD-75 Generators on hand is causing many problems. Only one of the twelve 3KW AC Generators placed on a priority requisition in November 1965 has been issued.

Improper siting of the VHF terminal at the forward artillery location caused several system outages. Closer coordination with supported units stressing the importance of proper siting will be made on future operations.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. When there are a large number of attachments to the Brigade, a second Operation Intelligence Net will reduce traffic on the primary Operation Intelligence Net, thus improving operations. This second net can be created on the Command Net frequency.

b. When an automatic retransmission FM relay station is being used during an operation and it is located in a central location, it should remain at this location throughout operations in the area to insure adequate communications to the combat elements.

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Inclosure 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
HUNT FOR US

1. (U) Public Information:

a. The following civilian news correspondents visited the Brigade:

- (1) David Snell - ABC News Team.
- (2) Ron Mansford - ABC News Team.
- (3) Frank Brady - ABC News Team.
- (4) Keyes Beech - Chicago Daily News.
- (5) Charles Mohr - New York Times.
- (6) Al Cheng - Associated Press.
- (7) Lin Young Choul - NBC News.
- (8) Warren Desworth - Dallas Times Herald.
- (9) Max McNamery - CBS News.
- (10) Leon Daniel - UPI.
- (11) Udo Resch - CBS News Team.
- (12) Bill Stout - CBS News Team.
- (13) Glendi Ballenger - CBS News Team.
- (14) William J. Cook - Newsweek.
- (15) Ian Dredie - London Daily Express.
- (16) Steve Van Meter - UPI.
- (17) Jack Beard - Stars and Stripes.
- (18) Howard Tuelner - NBC News Team.
- (19) Vo Huynh - NBC News Team.
- (20) Vi Giac - NBC News Team.
- (21) Bill Reilly - UPI (audio)
- (22) Art Zich - Time Magazine.
- (23) Paul Hemphill - Atlanta Journal.
- (24) Bill Boyles - Charleston News and Courier.
- (25) Rick Merrien - AP.
- (26) Bob O'Brien - AP.
- (27) Neil Miskoy - TV Europe.
- (28) Francis Paulmer - UPI.
- (29) Ward Just - Washington Post.

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Inelosure 7 (Information) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
"ACTION"

- (30) Dean Bowerless - HRC News Team.
 - (31) Schidner - HRC News Team.
 - (32) Sigulski - HRC News Team.
 - (33) Vo Sun - HRC News Team.
 - (34) Brig Gen (Ret) G. L. A. Marshall - Novelist.
- b. The following military correspondents visited the Brigade:
- (1) Sgt. Macado - ITV.
 - (2) Sgt. Wallace - MCH-10.
- c. Major publicity was obtained concerning the Brigade's activities to include all Television Networks, wire services, and news magazines throughout the Free World.
- d. Ward Just (Washington Post) was wounded by grenade fragments while with the 1/327th Tiger Force and was evacuated to HAIL TRUNG.
- e. The Information Office obtained electrical lighting and a press tent during this operation.
- f. Photographic processing was improved through the use of the HRCV dark room.
2. (U) Command Information.
- a. The receipt and distribution of command information newspapers continued to be generally late. This is a problem under continuous study for improvement.
 - b. The Diplomat & Warrior was published by letterpress for the first time during Operation "ACTION".
3. (U) Summary. Public exposure of the Brigade continued to improve with a significant increase in the percentage of copy released and subsequently printed.

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation HAWK ON 7

1. (U) Psychological Objective: Psychological Warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units in the operational area.

2. (C) Operation HAWK ON 7:

a. Leaflets: A total of 5,615,000 leaflets of the type indicated were dropped on the dates shown.

Date	Method	Number	Type
2 June	C-47	20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		120,000	28th Special
		130,000	Eagle Strike
		20,000	IFM
		20,000	Weapons Reward
		15,000	Chieu Hoi
4 June	C-47	20,000	Safe Conduct Pass
		40,000	Eagle Strike
		120,000	IFM
		40,000	28th Regt Special
5 June	C-47	600,000	Chieu Hoi
6 June	U-10	50,000	Chieu Hoi
		50,000	Weapons Reward
		100,000	Safe Conduct Pass
7 June	U-10	80,000	Chieu Hoi
	L-19	20,000	Chieu Hoi
	L-19	20,000	Safe Conduct Passes
8 June	U-10	50,000	Chieu Hoi
9 June	U-10	200,000	Eagle Strike
		660,000	Chieu Hoi
		40,000	Safe Conduct Pass
10 June	U-10	60,000	Air Superiority
		60,000	Weapons Reward
11 June	U-10	40,000	Chieu Hoi
		40,000	Demoralization

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations Action Report, Operation HUSTLE

13 June	U-10 & U-10	80,000 150,000 120,000 20,000 20,000	Radio Strike Chieu Hoi Demoralization Radio Strike Safe Conduct Pass
14 June	U-10	40,000 20,000 45,000	Chieu Hoi Radio Strike Demoralization
15 June	U-10	40,000 350,000 50,000	Du Co Poan Chieu Hoi Radio
16 June	U-10	80,000 120,000 150,000	Chieu Hoi Demoralization Radio
17 June	U-10 C-47	50,000 300,000 300,000	Radio Chieu Hoi Demoralization
18 June	C-47 U-10	200,000 200,000 200,000 40,000 40,000	Demoralization Radio Strike Radio 24th Regt Special Demoralization
19 June	C-47 U-10	200,000 200,000 400,000 100,000 100,000 25,000	Chieu Hoi Radio Strike Du Co Poan Chieu Hoi Du Co Poan Radio Strike
20 June	U-10	10,000 200,000 50,000	Du Co Poan Chieu Hoi Radio Strike

b. Loudspeaker: A total of 25 hours 45 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts were flown by USAF U-10, and C-47 aircraft on 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20th of June. The theme of all broadcasts was Chieu Hoi and demoralization. A total of three special tapes were made during the operation.

c. Summary: Two personalized, specialized, and localized leaflets and three special tapes were directed toward enemy units in the operational area (Inclosure 1 and 2). It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation contributed extensively to the demoralization of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing days of the operation, a total of four battalions had surrendered themselves to Brigade personnel.

d. Lessons Learned:

(1) When new leaflets are produced, particularly special leaflets, at least 200 copies of the translation should be included, as a matter of course. These copies will be used as handouts to UN visitors.

(2) Leaflet boxes should be coated with non-water resistant substance i.e. plastic, wax, etc, etc, and more securely bound as a greater protection against inclement weather.

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation "HARVEST"

(3) An example of contents should be clearly displayed on the outside of all leaflet boxes along with the amount and general classification (Chiou Mei, demoralization, reward, etc., etc.).

(4) The Psychological Operations Officer should have a comprehensive up to date catalogue of leaflets available to him.

(5) An augmentation to the Brigade of one Psy War school trained officer and two (if has been approved and personnel should be requisitioned and assigned on an expedited basis.

(6) The U-10 aircraft should be stationed at the Brigade CP.

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Inclosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation HUNGLOI

1. (C) Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery PS of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 82d Battery, 1st Battalion (Airmobile) 30th Artillery reinforced 2d Battalion (Airborne), 120th Artillery.

2. (C) Execution:

a. On 2 June B1/30 Arty displaced from ZB040227 at 0100 hrs to ZB059309 closing at 1530 hrs in support of operation by 1/227 Inf. At 022015 hrs B1/30's workmeter received light probe resulting in one (1) MIA (OC). There were no friendly casualties.

b. On 3 June Btry B displaced from ZB040227 by CM-47 starting at 1837 hrs. Btry used 13 sorties; closed ZB090342 at 1930 hrs where they fired 3 registrations, 28 targets of opportunity, 43 marking missions, 11 area illumination missions, 15 preparations, 1 defensive concentrations, 3 screening missions, 36 MIA targets in support of 1/227 Inf and 2/512 Inf.

c. On 4 June B1/30 Arty displaced by road to ZB084344 starting at 1600 hrs and closing at 1845 hrs to reinforce the fires of Btry B in support of 1/227 Inf. In this position B1/30 Arty fired 61 missions amending 115 rounds reinforcing the fires of Btry B.

d. On 6 June B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB014210 by road starting at 1515 hrs and closing at 1725 hrs.

e. At 0700 hrs 7 June Btry B was attacked by an estimated battalion of the North Vietnamese Army. One platoon of B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB041227 at 0400 hrs where they fired 199 rounds in support of the defense of Btry B. The battle continued until 0745 hrs when the enemy broke contact. Friendly losses were 3 MIA, 21 WIA, 1 - M102 howitzer destroyed, 1 - M151 destroyed, 3 - 2 1/2 ton trucks destroyed, 3 - 2 mortar telescopes destroyed, 1 - M-2 riding circle destroyed, and 1 M107-46 radio destroyed. Enemy losses were 39 MIA (OC), 11 - Chi Com grenades, 5 - M26 grenades, 4 rocket launchers, and 3 M107-46 rifles. At 0800 hrs Btry C displaced to ZB060256 closing at 0900 hrs to render further support to the defenses of Btry B. At 1115 hrs B1/30 Arty (-) displaced to ZB060256 closing at 1145 hrs to reinforce fires of Btry C.

f. On 8 June B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB090346 by road starting at 1725 hrs and closing at 1500 hrs to reinforce fires of Btry B. Btry moved to ZB090346 by road starting at 1807 hrs, and closing at 1805 hrs. In this position B1/30 Arty fired 3 registrations, 11 preparations, 3 illumination missions, 18 targets of opportunity and 210 MIA missions. Btry A fired 3 registrations, 18 marking missions, 20 targets of opportunity, 6 illumination missions, 4 preparations, 9 defensive concentrations, 1 screening mission, and 108 MIA's.

g. At 130100 hrs task force 1/320 Arty was formed and given the additional missions of providing security and convey escort on Route 11100. The task force consisted of the 1/320th Arty, B1/30 Arty, 1 CMDC company, 2 platoons 12/17 Cav, and 1 platoon 4/125 Arty. The route was initially secured by using strong points along the route manned by the CMDC company. On 12 June a mine was discovered on the route, and it was determined that better route security could be provided by indirect fire. From 12 June until 20 June the route was secured during darkness by a heavy M107 program. There were no mining incidents after 12 June.

h. On 19 June Btry A displaced to ZB041227 at 1255 hrs.

i. On 20 June Btry B and B1/30 Arty displaced to ZB060256 closing at 1840 hrs and 1637 hrs respectively.

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Inlosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
"HIT CORSE"

3. (C) Supply and Administration: Originally the batteries deployed with (3) days rations and a basic load of class V. Batteries were resupplied both by convey and helicopter due to the tactical situation.

4. (C) Problem Areas:

a. Security of main supply routes: In the initial phase of the operation, TF 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was formed and consisted of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery Battalion, one GPO company, two Cavalry platoons, and one Engineer platoon. The mission of the attached elements was to provide security for the battalion firing position and to provide security along the resupply route from Dak Co to the battalion firing position. After a mining incident on the resupply route it was decided to pull all of the security elements in around the battalion firing positions every night and to secure the road at night with a heavy program of VT fuze M&I fires. This scheme proved to be very effective for it not only prevented future mining incidents, but also allowed for greater security of the firing positions.

b. Security of Battery Firing Positions: It was found during this operation that a very close perimeter defense is essential to battery security. The perimeter should be far enough from the firing positions to prevent hand grenades from reaching the gun crews and yet close enough to permit a high degree of control of the perimeter force in order to facilitate direct artillery fire against the enemy. During the NVA attack on B Battery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery, the inability to locate the infantry security elements prevented the use of the Beehive round. It is recommended that the security elements with the artillery be placed under the operational control of the artillery commander.

c. Tac Air, Artillery, Infantry Coordination: As in past operations of the complexity of this operation, unnecessary hulls in the firing of artillery and Tac Air occurred. This can be attributed to many factors, some of which are: lack of control by the ground force commander, poor timing on the part of the artillery FO, mission saturation of the artillery FO, and communication difficulties. Upon completion of this operation all artillery LEO's, FO's and the artillery S-3 were assembled and this problem was discussed in detail. A detailed list of causes and recommended solutions is being prepared for discussion with all personnel concerned.

d. Mishandling of Artillery Ammunition: This is a subject that requires constant command supervision. Ammo handlers, if not properly supervised, will damage ammunition. Helicopter lifts to resupply firing batteries are particularly damaging to ammunition because of the speed with which loading and unloading must be accomplished. Damaged ammunition could be the cause of some of the muzzle bursts that have occurred in NVA.

5. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Pull all of the security elements in and around the artillery firing positions at night and secure the area around the positions with heavy M&I fires.

b. It was found that by covering main supply routes with VT on the road and quick (Q) on the sides of the road, main supply routes were more rapidly opened in the morning.

c. Surface movement: Only one battery displacement during the entire operation was made by helicopter. All other displacements were overland moves. It was learned that by using the available few vehicles within this battalion, Support Battalion, ARVN units and the attached 155 prime movers

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Inlosure 9 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
HARTORIE

that all batteries could be moved overland expeditiously and without incident.
The conclusion is that it is not necessary for this battalion to have prime
movers for each howitzer as it was originally believed.

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Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 9 Recap of Positions occupied and missions fired:

A Battery

30 May - 8 June 1966

POSITION: ZB041227

Total No Men's: 63

Conducted: 55 H&I
2 Reg
3 MK/rds
3 Targets of Opportunity

Expended: 284 H&I
2 HC
33 WP

8 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: ZB090345

Total No Men's: 256

Conducted: 186 H&I
3 Reg
16 MK/rds
30 Targets of Opportunity
6 Ill/Msn's
6 Props
9 DF Conc
1 Screening Msn

Expended: 5,789 H&I
246 H&I
43 H&I
64 WP
43 Ill
110 HC
6 Yellow Smoke

B Battery

30 May - 3 June 1966

POSITION: ZB014218

Total No Men's: 135

Conducted: 112 H&I
3 Reg
13 MK/rds
7 Targets of Opportunity

Expended: 606 H&I
42 H&I
2 WP
15 Yellow smoke
4 HC

4 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: ZB089347

Total No Men's: 490

Conducted: 361 H&I
3 Reg
43 MK/rds
11 Ill
15 Prep
16 DF Conc
3 Screening Men's
38 Targets of Opportunity

Expended: 6,738 H&I
228 H&I
17 H&I
124 WP
186 HC
180 Ill
2 Yellow Smoke
2 Red Smoke

C Battery

1 June - 7 June 1966

POSITION: ZB015218

Total No Men's: 79

Conducted: 66 H&I
3 Reg
9 MK/rds

Expended: 776 H&I
3 WP
7 Yellow Smoke

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Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 9 Recap of Positions occupied and missions fired:

C. P. 1000

7 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: 2304026	Total No Msn's: 381
Conducted: 299 MI	Expended: 2,752 MTG
2 Reg	145 MTG
15 MI/rds	77 MT
3 Ill	20 Ill
13 Dr Conc	16 TC
19 Prop	11 Yellow Smoke
30 Targets of Opportunity	1 Green Smoke

3/1/30

30 May - 1 June 1966

POSITION: 2304027	Total No Msn's: 77
Conducted: 67 MI	Expended: 389 MTG
	12 MT
	4 TC
	2 Ill

5 June - 6 June 1966

POSITION: 23059309	Total No Msn's: 61
Conducted: 58 MI	Expended: 103 MTG
	1 MT
	7 Smoke

7 June 1966

POSITION: 23014210	Total No Msn's: 19
Conducted: 18 MI	Expended: 199 MTG

7 June - 8 June 1966

POSITION: 2304026	Total No Msn's: 13
Conducted: 11 MI	Expended: 175 MTG
	3 MT

8 June - 20 June 1966

POSITION: 23090346	Total No Msn's: 245
Conducted: 210 MI	Expended: 4,534 MTG
3 Reg	12 MT
11 Prop	3 TC
3 Ill	48 Ill
13 Targets of Opportunity	

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